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ARGUMENT 
POINT I THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
PLAINTIFF DISCOVERY. 
The complaint in this action alleged that Images had fraudulently transferred 
all its assets to Neways, rendering Images incapable of satisfying its debt to Macris and 
requiring Macris to sue Neways to set aside that fraudulent conveyance. When Macris 
sent out discovery requests designed to demonstrate the fraudulent transfer and the fact 
that Images had no assets from which to satisfy its debt to Macris, the defendants 
objected, arguing that they shouldn't have to provide this information "unless and until 
Plaintiff can show this action was necessary in order to collect the judgment against 
Images . . . " This frames the Catch 22 which is the defendants' position: when you 
prove it was necessary for you to bring this action we will give you the information that 
establishes that fact. The defendants have never cited any legal authority to support 
their position. Instead, they recite the fact that the case is old as being somehow an 
indication that the Court should simply make it go away. While they cite authority 
regarding the discretion of the trial court in matters relating to discovery, they offer no 
authority for the proposition that it is within a trial court's discretion to deny plaintiff 
discovery from the defendants "unless and until" plaintiff has demonstrated an element 
of its claim from a source other than the defendants themselves. Plaintiff's 
interrogatory number 13 asked defendants what assets Images had after its transfer of 
assets to Neways. A truthful answer to this question (as defendants well know) is: 
1 
essentially none. This fact alone would establish why it was necessary for Macris to 
bring the present action against Neways, the company to which Images transferred all 
its assets. 
Defendants' approach to this case is also disingenuous. While it chides 
Macris for failing to provide a record citation for its argument that the Court required 
Macris to make an evidentiary showing before it would permit discovery from the 
defendants, defendants know that the Court's ruling recited that "if Macris is successful 
in demonstrating that it incurred attorney's fees as a natural consequence of Images1 
breach and that the second claim was in fact necessary, the Court will then consider 
whether Neways should be required to respond to the discovery requests]." Ruling of 
January 12, 2004, at p. 2. (A copy of which is in the Addendum hereto.) 
The most disingenuous of defendants' suggestions is the implication that the 
Images' judgment would have been paid if only Macris would have asked that it be 
satisfied. This suggestion flies in the face of the fact that Images appealed the original 
judgment and Neways denied any liability for that judgment in the trial court, this 
Court and the Supreme Court. Only after the Supreme Court ruled in Macris1 favor 
was the judgment satisfied. 
In a truly odd bit of sophistry, the defendants suggest that Macris suffered no 
prejudice from the trial court's error in denying discovery by asserting that there may 
have been record "evidence potentially relating to the alleged fraudulent transfer that 
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could have been used in an attempt to defeat Neways' motion for summary judgment." 
Defendants' brief at p. 15. This suggestion is obviously contrary to the representation 
defendants made in the court below, that there was no evidence of record to create a 
genuine issue of material fact, and is not supported by any indication of what this 
mystery evidence is supposed to have been or how it supposedly related to the issue of 
the necessity of Macris bringing this action to recover on its claim against Images. 
In reality, this argument is simply made in a vain effort to avoid this court's 
acknowledgment in Askew v. Hardman, 884 P.2d 1258 (Ut. App. 1994), rev'd on 
other grounds. 918 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1996), that the erroneous denial of discovery is 
presumptively prejudicial. 884 P.2d at 1262-63. The "facts" articulated by defendants 
in no way speak to the question of how the result of this case would have been altered 
had the requested discovery been provided. To meet their burden under Askew, the 
defendants would have to have demonstrated that truthful responses to the discovery 
requests wouldn't have affected the result reached below. This they have not done and 
could not do. 
It is also troubling that defendants suggest that Macris was somehow culpable 
for not being more vigilant in pursuing collection from Images, implying that Images 
was a viable entity in 1995 and thereafter. At least in the trial court when counsel 
prepared an exhibit for the court showing the time line of this action he had it 
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accurately reflect that on September 1, 1992 Images "ceases doing business." (See 
exhibit 2 in Addendum.) To imply otherwise in this Court is to be less than candid. 
Plaintiff submits that the reason the defendants encumbered their brief with 
reference to evidence from a different case and unspecified facts that they claim may be 
in the record in this case is an effort to avoid what they know to be true, that accurate 
responses to plaintiff's discovery would have proven plaintiff's case and should have 
been required. 
POINT II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
Defendants contend that under the holding of Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 
U.S. 317 (1986), Macris had an affirmative duty to come forward with evidence to 
defeat their motion for summary judgment. The Utah Supreme Court has previously 
noted that the rule announced in Celotex has never been adopted by our Supreme Court 
and, in fact, the Court has expressly declined to adopt Celotex. See Harline v. Barker, 
912 P.2d 433, 445n.l3 (Utah 1996). Furthermore, to the extent federal law can be said 
to put an affirmative duty on the plaintiff to produce evidence on an issue upon which 
plaintiff has the burden of proof, that duty only arises after the plaintiff has had a full 
opportunity to conduct discovery from the defendants. As stated by the Court in 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 202 (1986), a case decided on the same day 
as Celotex, 
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the plaintiff must present affirmative evidence in order to 
defeat a properly supported motion for summary 
judgment. This is true even where the evidence is likely 
to be within the possession of the defendant, as long as 
the plaintiff has had a full opportunity to conduct 
discovery. 
477 U.S. at 257 (emphasis added). 
In the present case, the Court ruled that defendants didn't have to respond to 
discovery designed to demonstrate that Macris had to sue Neways to collect on the debt 
owed to it by Images because Images had transferred all its assets to Neways in 
exchange for essentially nothing. The discovery requests, if they had been answered 
truthfully, would have established facts which would not only have been sufficient to 
defeat summary judgment but would have demonstrated the existence of a fraudulent 
transfer as a matter of law. It defies logic to say that a plaintiff must produce evidence 
of facts solely within the possession of the defendants and then deny it the opportunity 
to conduct discovery of the defendants. Defendants have never cited any authority 
supporting their argument in this regard and there is none. It was error for the court 
below to grant summary judgment because the plaintiff didn't proffer the evidence 
which the Court had previously ruled the defendants did not have to provide to 
plaintiff. 
It is ironic that defendants now suggest there may have been record evidence 
creating a material issue of fact which could have precluded summary judgment. Even 
under Celotex, it is the obligation of the moving party to establish the nonexistence of 
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evidence on an issue on which the nonmoving party bears the burden. It cannot simply 
assert that plaintiff has no evidence and put plaintiff to its proof, it must affirmatively 
demonstrate the absence of evidence. As explained by Justice Brennan in Celotex, in 
an opinion where he dissented from the Court's application of the rule announced but 
not from the rule itself, if the moving party seeks to establish that the nonmoving party 
has no evidence on an issue upon which he bears the burden of proof, 
the mechanics of discharging Rule 56's burden of 
production are somewhat trickier. Plainly, a conclusory 
assertion that the nonmoving party has no evidence is 
insufficient. Such a "burden" of production is no burden 
at all and would simply permit summary judgment 
procedure to be converted into a tool for harassment. 
Rather, as the Court confirms, a party who moves for 
summary judgment on the ground that the nonmoving 
party has no evidence must affirmatively show the 
absence of evidence in the record. This may require the 
moving party to depose the nonmoving party's witnesses 
or to establish the inadequacy of documentary evidence. 
If there is literally no evidence in the record, the moving 
party may demonstrate this by reviewing for the court 
the admissions, interrogatories, and other exchanges 
between the parties that are in the record. Either way, 
however, the moving party must affirmatively 
demonstrate that there is no evidence in the record to 
support a judgment for the nonmoving party. 
If the moving party has not fully discharged this initial 
burden of production, its motion for summary judgment 
must be denied, and the court need not consider whether 
the moving party has met its ultimate burden of 
persuasion. 
477 U.S. at 332 (citations omitted). 
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By suggesting to this Court that there was evidence in the record which might 
have created a material issue of fact, which defendants did not bring to the attention of 
the court below, defendants are acknowledging (albeit unwittingly) that their motion 
was not "properly supported" within the meaning the United States Supreme Court gave 
to Rule 56. For that reason alone the motion should have been denied even if the rule 
announced in Celotex was applicable. 
Under Utah law, however, unless the party moving for summary judgment 
has supported that motion with evidence establishing the absence of a material issue of 
fact, the nonmoving party is entitled to rely on the allegations of his complaint to defeat 
the motion. In Wilkinson v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., (Utah 1998), the Court noted 
that the defendant 
has not supported its motion for summary judgment - it 
has offered no affidavits showing that the facts are 
undisputed facts. Because [the defendant] has offered no 
affidavits disputing [the plaintiff's] allegations, it has not 
met its burden of showing that there are no material 
issues of fact. Consequently [plaintiff] may rely on the 
allegations in her pleadings. 
975 P.2d at 465. See also, Lamb v. B & B Amusements Corp.. 869 P.2d 926 (Utah 
1993). 
In this case, defendants offered no evidence on the issue of Images' ability to 
satisfy its debt to Macris and Macris was entitled to rely on the allegations of its 
complaint that Images lacked that ability to defeat the motion for summary judgment. 
? 
It is worth noting that Wilkinson was decided two years after Celotex and did not adopt 
its holding that a plaintiff may be required to present affirmative evidence on an issue 
on which it bears the burden if the defendant can properly demonstrate that the record 
contains no evidence on that issue. As noted above, however, defendants did not 
properly make mat demonstration in this case and summary judgment was erroneous 
even under the Celotex rule which Utah has never adopted. 
CONCLUSION 
The court below abused its discretion in denying plaintiff the opportunity to 
conduct discovery of the defendants and erred in granting summary judgment on 
defendants' motion which was not properly supported within the meaning of Rule 56 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants have never presented any evidence to 
rebut plaintiff's allegations that this action was made necessary because Images 
fraudulently transferred its assets to Neways, nor could they. The judgment below 
should be vacated and the matter remanded with instructions to compel that defendants' 
respond to plaintiff's discovery requests. 
DATED this^-day of J L ^ ^ _. 2005. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
B y ^ ^fa^fc/C ^L 
M. Datvid Eckersley ^ 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Macris & Associates, Inc. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MACRIS & ASSOCIATES, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NEWAYS, INC., THOMAS E MOWER, and 
LESLIE D MOWER, 
Defendants. 
RULING 
CASE NO. 950400093 
JUDGE: GARY D STOTT 
CLERK: KS 
RULING 
On November 20, 2003, counsel for the respective parties appeared before the Court 
concerning Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Responses to Discovery and for Attorneys' Fees, and 
Defendant's Motion for Protective Order and/or to Bifurcate. Prior to hearing argument from 
counsel, the memoranda and materials previously submitted which addressed the issues in 
question had been read by the Court. After hearing argument, the Court took the matter under 
advisement, desiring to review the material again and to be more fully informed. After doing so, 
and having reviewed the record with respect to oral arguments, the Court enters this ruling. 
As has been stated by counsel for the parties, this action is far too old, and should be 
resolved. The present litigation was filed just prior to the first lawsuit going to trial against 
Images and Attitudes, Inc. In that case, Macris sought judgment against Images based on the 
parties' pfior^bfislness relationsliips. In the Macris I case, as indicated above, Macris obtained a 
stipulated judgment against Images in the amount of $360,681.20 just prior to the time of trial. 
However, the judgment was not then paid. Macris then sought to hold Neways liable for the 
Images judgment based on fraudulent transfer, successor liability and alter ego claims. Macris 
claims that it was entitled to recover damages because it was forced to file this present action in 
order to collect the Images judgment. The Images judgment was paid in February 2001 by 
Neways International. 
At present, the issue before this Court is whether Macris is entitled to recover attorneys' 
fees based on the third party litigation exception. In the recent decision of the Utah Court of 
Appeals it is stated, "Furthermore, in order to recover attorneys' fees under the third party 
litigation exception, Macris must also show that Macris II was a natural consequence of Images' 
breach and that it was necessary to bring this action." Macris and Associates, Inc., vs. Neways. 
Inc., 60 P.3rd 1176 (Utah App. 2002). 
A discovery dispute has occurred by reason of Plaintiff s Motion to Compel Defendants to 
respond to discovery submitted by Macris. Macris believes that it is entitled to recover damages, 
including punitive, against Neways based upon its fraudulent transfer, successor liability and alter 
ego claims. However, Neways believes that the Utah Court of Appeals opinion limits Macris to 
what it may be entitled to recover as to attorneys' fees that were incurred by Macris as a "natural 
consequence" of Images' breach and which necessitated the filing of this action. 
Since the matter now before the Court is one of first impression with this particular Court, 
I believe the Court of Appeals has limited Plaintiffs recovery, if any, solely to attorneys' fees 
which it may have incurred in this action, that are the "natural consequences" of Images' breach. 
Therefore this Court finds that Plaintiffs discovery requests are premature and may be 
unnecessary. This Court therefore agrees that the discovery requests served upon Neways are at 
the present, unduly burdensome, oppressive, and not likely to lead to the discovery of admissible 
evidence relevant to remaining issue, that of attorneys' fees. The Court of Appeals remanded this 
case for the determination of whether Macris is entitled to recover attorneys' fees based on the 
third party litigation exception. Consequently, this Court believes that it is appropriate to issue a 
protective order limiting discovery to determine the amount of attorneys' fees, if any, incurred by 
Macris in seeking to collect the Images judgment and whether this present action was a natural 
consequences of Images' breach of contract making it necessary to bring this present claim. 
On the other hand, if Macris is successful in demonstrating that it incurred attorneys' fees 
as a natural consequence of Images' breach, and that the second claim was in fact necessary, the 
Court will then consider whether Neways should be required to respond to the discovery request. 
The Court therefore believes that it is appropriate to bifurcate the issue of whether Macris II was 
a natural consequence of Images' breach and necessary to obtain the satisfaction of judgment. 
Therefore the motion by Macris to compel is denied, and the Motion for Protective Order and/or 
to Bifurcate is granted. Also, the request for attorneys' fees is denied. Counsel for Defendant 
shall prepare the appropriate order and submit it within 20 days of the date of this ruling. 
DATED this / £ day of UCt^ 2004. 
imfc' 
Judge Gary D Sfctt \~. I^S^ft^^f 
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